New writing technology approaches the origin of langage

A significant feature of hypertext environments is their capacity for inclusion, their construction of a vast and necessarily unfinished order of documents striving to represent the knowledge (and the agon) of a discipline.

My former hypertext phonereader/metabole - hypertext essay - was based upon 20 different topics.

This one hypertextopia/metabole focuses on three philosophers and three of their personal philosophical principles:

1. Walter Benjamin and his replacement of Plato's theory of forms and Ideas by a theory of linguistics and textual writing. Paradoxically, new writing technology approaches the origin of langage.
2. Martin Heidegger and his latest ontology of permanent mutation: at last, Being has to be metabolized.
3. Cornelius Castoriadis and his creating "social imaginary signification" that cannot be deduced from rational or real, empirical elements or specific forces.

As yet, no boundless writing space exists, so I have had to try to create my own simulacrum of a textual domain. I have tried to exploit hypertext's capaciousness by offering extended passages from some of authors I cite. The current state of copyright law, however, precludes posting works in their entirety (and frankly, scanning or typing that much stuff would have been too tedious and time-consuming anyway). I have, therefore, included less than 10% of any given work to comply with the "fair use" provisions of the law.

Sometimes, all you will want is a standard bibliographical reference -- just enough to enable you can to get the book or article and read it in its entirety, without my noisome interjections, distracting comments, and distorting editorial decisions. Simple references to page numbers will occur in the text and the full bibliographic information will occur on the list of works cited (a link should take you directly from an author's name to the bibliography). An extended passage from the cited work is available whenever a citation is associated with this symbol )°°°°°°°°°°°°°°) .

There are approximately 11658 nodes and 180.000 links in this hypertext essay.

NOW enter the Hypertext _ Hypertextopia

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Augustine and metaphysics

Jean-Luc Marion claims that the word ‘metaphysics’ does not apply to ancient thought at all – despite the fact that Heidegger regularly cites Aristotle as exemplifying ‘the onto-theo-logical structure of metaphysics.’

Scholars such as P. Aubenque, J.-F. Courtine, T. De Koninck, F. Nef have shown that Aristotle's plural and aporetic investigations do not constitute an ontotheology in the sense developed by the commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Simplicius, or by Avicenna, a theory in which the notion of being, whether analogical or univocal, acts as a pivot in a systematic ontology of universal ens commune grounded in the divine summum ens. But in a broader, simpler and more radical sense, Aristotle is surely a metaphysician, identifying being as ousia, substance, and grounding beings causally in the supreme being, the divine 'self-thinking thought.' Let us not forget the phenomenological bearing of Heidegger's thought. It is from the intellectualization of the phenomenon of the ontological difference between beings and their being that metaphysics emerges; and metaphysics from the start is ontotheology, that is a logos about being. Heidegger wants to return to a different kind of logos, a legein that sets forth being and beings in their primary phenomenological senses, before the construction of a metaphysical logos.

Marion's position has the effect of cutting off Augustine from the history of metaphysics, and situating him in an extraterritorial realm of purely Christian thought. With the phenomenological purism that is his hallmark, Marion can thus clear the ground for a ‘reduction’ of Augustine in terms of a number of ‘saturated phenomena’ such as divine truth that enlightens conscience or the ineffable divine ultimacy. These phenomena are severed from their close relationship to Neoplatonic experience of similar realities, or rather, in Augustine’s own view, of the same realities.

see Joseph S. O'Leary

see Journal de l'Hypertexte en philosophie

Baudrillard and Heidegger in the past

Baudrillard and Heidegger, 2

Fast forward from the material governing the previous post, to May of 1999, to what amounts, in other words, to a thirty year jump. We are near the end of Baudrillard's career now rather than its beginning, and Baudrillard is doing a series of Wellek lectures at the University of California, Irvine. In the third lecture, entitled the "Murder of the Real," Baudrillard rehearses a theme that has been more or less a constant to his work since The Perfect Crime, namely that reality has died, been ex-terminated, and has not and never will be resurrected. Indeed, it's corpse may never even be found. He notes:

For reality is but a concept, or a principle, and by reality I mean the whole system of values connected with this principle. The Real as such implies an origin, an end, a past and a future, a chain of causes and effects, a continuity and a rationality. No real without these elements, without an objective configuration of discourse. And its disappearing is the dislocation of this whole constellation.
This argument is bound up, for Baudrillard, with virtualization and virtual reality, and a critique of new information technology. I have never been particularly convinced by his critiques of these technologies, but I do find the cultural inference he draws from them to be accurate; in other words, whether virtual reality itself does anything to dissolve the real, the discursive field that enables something like the term "virtual reality" is evidence already that the dissolution has taken place, that it has become susceptible to qualification, subdivision, and hyper-realization.

This collapse of reality is an argument for which Baudrillard is particularly well known, but it will come as no surprise that the Heidegger of Being and Time is also dedicated to a dissolution of the metaphysical reality principle, though his reasons for thinking this dissolution are far more subjectal in orientation (again, at least that's the case back in 1927).

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Joyful way of thinking

In psychoanalytic terms, Hegel’s ontology is fundamentally mournful, while Heidegger’s ontology is fundamentally melancholic.

Brent Adkins argues that the solution to this antinomy is found in Deleuze and Guatttari’s Anti-Oedipus, where they take us beyond the limits of mourning and melancholia by refusing both. The result is a new (joyful) way of thinking about death that does not require philosophy to be a constant meditation on death.

Deleuze believed that life is desire, and that there are two distinct ways of thinking about desire. The first is that we only desire because we lack something. The other is called productive desire, in that we desire to make new connections, not necessarily because we lack connections, but because we want to try something new. Deleuze would argue that Heidegger and Hegel would think that desires are based on a lack of something. Deleuze ultimately believed that life is not about living to fill a lack or a void, but rather to make connections. Because Deleuze conceived of desire as productive, his conception of death is joyful rather than mournful or melancholic.

- See the journal French Metablog with today different posts - Jean-Philippe Pastor

Work of Art

Heidegger's way of thinking has left a rich legacy for post-modern philosophers, particularly for Jacques Derrida who has greatly influenced philosophy and literature in the modern times.

Derrida, like his mentor Heidegger, understands that in the Western philosophy, the meaning of being has been determined by metaphysics of presence. However, unlike Heidegger, Derrida does not begin his philosophical career with a question on being. Nor does he take up philosophical positions -- traditional or otherwise.

The purpose of the present study is the critical evaluation of Derrida's claim that he deconstructed one of Heidegger's most important essays -- "The Origin of the Work of Art" -- by which he tries to overcome the metaphysics of presence.

The book presents an in-depth analysis of Heidegger's question of the meaning of being, and Derrida's critique of western logocentrism and his philosophy of deconstruction. It delves into the origin of the truth of the work of art -- studying the essence of thing, equipment and work of art, as philosophised by Heidegger. It discusses truth as the strife, taking orginary strife as the essence of the meaning of being. It also includes Derrida's criticism of the restitution of the truth of the work of art, and an evaluation of the differential structure of the truth of the painting -- as a work of art. A comparative study of the philosophies of Heidegger and Derrida has been given under 'non-originary origin of truth' and 'difference as the origin'.

References have been given at the end of each chapter to facilitate easy understanding of the concepts discussed in the text. Besides, there is a comprehensive bibliography giving primary as well as secondary sources from which the book has drawn. The book shall be highly useful to the students and teachers of Philosophy, Theology, Metaphysics and the researchers in these fields.

Difference at the Origin : Derrida's Critique of Heidegger's Philosophy of the Work of Art
Paul Manithottil, Atlantic Pub, 2008

Heidegger: You made it for real Martin !

Realism can mean many things.

For how I understand Heidegger, it simply indicates that intentional perception must be conceived as a directing-towards-the-extant-world. Such a directing is conceived in terms of a behavioral comportment, with perception being a form of doing.

Moreover, in order to think this concept of perception, we must reexamine the traditional dichotomy between the subjective and objective spheres. Heidegger makes a deeply insightful point that humans think of everything in terms of “being extant”, that is, in terms of a persistence, a “reality”, an occurring.

Moreover, in thinking of intentionality, we cannot discover it in terms of a relation between extant objects and therefore, we think “if it is not objective then it is something subjective” . However, because of our “mode of understanding” applies to even the realm of subjectivity, “the subject, again, is taken with the same ontological indeterminateness to be something extant” (ibid.); indeterminateness meaning that we have no real understanding of what we are saying when we declare “the subject” to be extant and constantly present-at-hand throughout our waking life.

On the contrary, precisely with the aid of intentionality and its peculiarity of being neither objective nor subjective, we should stop short and ask: Must not the being to which this phenomenon, neither objective nor subjective, obviously belongs be conceived differently than it thus far has been? (ibid.)

Moreover,

Intentionality is neither objective nor subjective in the usual sense, although it is certainly both, but in a much more original sense, since intentionality, as belonging to the Dasein’s existence, makes it possible that this being, the Dasein, comports existingly towards the extant.

“Comports existingly towards the extant”. Phrases to such an effect are littered through these sections on intentionality and perception.

The statement that the comportments of the Dasein are intentional means that the mode of being of our own self, the Dasein, is essentially such that this being, so far as it is, is always already dwelling with the extant. The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is not yet outside it but encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are.

Here we can see why Heideggerian ontology has often been adapted to underlay the theoretical structure of modern ecological – or situated – cognitive science, which is at odds with the innerpictorial sense-data theorists. Heidegger concurs with Gibson in his critique of cognitivist sense-data theories when he claims “To say that I am in the first place oriented toward sensations is all just pure theory. In conformity with its sense of direction, perception is directed toward a being that is extant. It intends this precisely as extant and knows nothing at all about sensations that it is apprehending” . “For the Dasein there is no outside, for which reason it is also absurd to talk about an inside”.

How people could read these sections and conclude that Heidegger wasn’t a direct realist or an externalist is beyond me.

Can we not put to rest any such notions with the following passage?

Does the perceivedness of a being, of an existent, constitute its existence? Are existence, actuality, and perceivedness one and the same? The window, however, surely does not receive existence from my perceiving it, but just the reverse: I can perceive it only if it exists and because it exists.

I therefore argue that Heidegger was not an antirealist who thought that our perceiving the world is what primordially constitutes the extant world. The world is extant without our perceiving it and we have a nonmediated access to it through intentional comportment. However, the intentional as-structure bestows significance upon the world, not because our perceptual systems are “constructing” it, but rather, because the as-structure filters our experience in terms of “obects” and “things” i.e. “entities”. In Being and Time, Heidegger defines “Being” as “that which determines entities as entities“. In Basic Problems, we see the same essential point:

This entity [nature] is intraworldly. But intraworldliness does not belong to nature’s being. Rather, in commerce with this entity, nature in the broadest sense, we understand that this entity is as something extant [occurrent], as an entity that we run up against, to which we are delivered over, which on its own part always already is. It is, even if we do not uncover it, i.e. without our encountering it in our world. Being within the world devolves upon this entity, nature, only when it is uncovered as an entity.

I rest my case.

Gary Williams

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Jean-Philippe Pastor

Heidegger and the object

Levinas refutes the Heideggerian notion that the existents in our lives, whether they be bread, hammers, pens, etc. are simply tools, or “means of life.”

Levinas claims that, though we might need such tools, they are actually enjoyed.

This is the beginning of the concept he calls “living from…” Levinas claims, in opposition to the Heideggerian school of thought, that “existence is not exhausted by utilitarian schematism that delineates (existents) as having the existence of hammers, needles, or machines. They are always in a certain measure– and even the hammers, needles, and machines are objects of enjoyment…” says Levinas.

But according to Clark, this is simply wrong. Heidegger doesn’t think in the least that utility exhausts existence. Rather looking at how objects are encountered in one kind of relationship allows an existential analysis. There are other sorts of analysis – some hinted at – beyond what the focus is in Being and Time. And indeed the latter Heidegger often delves into those. (IMO) Now it is true that Heidegger argues that one way (perhaps the most important way) we encounter entities is through a break down of utility. The ready-at-hand allowing the present-at-hand to be presented to us.

However to suggest the only way to be with other occurrent entities is via utility is just plain wrong.

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Jean-Philippe Pastor

Derrida, the falling, the thrownness

JD: (According to Heidegger) the categories of Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit are intended to avoid those of object (correlate of the subject) and instrument.

Dasein is first of all thrown.

What would link the analytic of Dasein with the heritage of the subject would perhaps be more the determination of Dasein as Geworfenheit, its primordial being-thrown, rather than that of a subject which would come to be thrown, but a being thrown which would be more primordial than subjectivity and therefore also than objectivity.
A passivity which would be more primordial than traditional passivity and than Gegenstand (Gegenwurf, the old German word for object, keeps this reference to throwing, without yet stabilizing it into the stance of a stehen). I refer you to what I have said about the dé-sistance on the subject of the subject in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. I am trying to think through this experience of the throwing/being-thrown of the subjectile beyond the Heideggerian protocols about which I was just speaking and to link it to another thinking of destination, of chance and of destinerrance. Starting at “birth”, and possibly even prior to it, being-thrown reappropriates itself or rather ex-appropriates itself in forms which are not yet those of the subject or the project.
The question “who” then becomes: “who (is) thrown?” “Who becomes “who” from out of the destinerrance of the being-thrown?” That it is still a matter here of the trace, but also of iterability means that this ex appropriation cannot be absolutely stabilized in the form of the subject. The subject assumes presence, that is to say sub-stance, stasis, stance. Not to be able to stabilize itself absolutely would mean to be able only to be stabilizing itself. Ex-appropriation no longer closes itself; it never totalizes itself. One should not take these figures for metaphors (metaphoricity implies exappropriation), nor determine them according to the grammatical opposition of active/passive.
Between the thrown and the falling (Verfallen) there is also a possible point of passage. Why is Geworfenheit, while never put into question, subsequently given to marginalization in Heidegger’s thinking? This is what, it seems to me, we must continue to ask. And ex-appropriation does not form a boundary, if one understands by this word a closure or a negativity.

It implies the irreducibility of the relation to the other.

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Jean-Philippe Pastor

Hegel's interpretation of time

This a text from Mike Johnduff.


Division Two, Chapter Six, xvi... The extent to which an even more radical understanding of time than Hegel's makes itself evident in Kant, will be shown in the first division of the second part of this treatise.

The reference to the first division of the second part of course doesn't mean anything, because this portion was never published. I haven't read Heidegger's book on Kant yet, which is supposed to answer some of the issues that first division of the second part would have posed, but I'm just thinking now that, given Heidegger's interpretation of the historizing potential of Dasein, Kant would have a more radical understanding of time than Hegel.

Hegel reduces time down to history. And while Heidegger's view of time is probably closest to Hegel's with respect to the the degree to which he accords it importance and determining power over Being, Heidegger we know is farthest from Hegel in interpreting things as present-at-hand or as realized potentials, and thus might have more affinity with the indeterminate and yet primordial phenomenon of time in Kant.

That is, Hegel reduces time right down to the now, and then extends this now out to encompass history. Kant leaves time intederminate--it has no relation to history other than as the factor which makes it possible. Because it is a possibility or a categorical determinant of existence for Kant, then, it might be closer to the act of stretching-itself-along or temporalizing itself historically that Heidegger has in mind when he says Dasein historizes. And because this potential is so determinate yet not present-at-hand at all in Kant, it might then be said to be more "radical:" it hits more at the nature of temporality as it determines Being.

While Hegel gives time such an important place in its ability to detemine Being, he ultimately undoes this importance in making it something present-at-hand. Kant of course leaves time mostly unelaborated as a concept--that is, when compared to Hegel--but it remains less present-at-hand than in Hegel and thus more powerful.

Posted by Mike Johnduff


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Time finds its meaning in death or eternity ?

According to Heidegger, we can only understand the phenomenon of time from our mortal or finite vantage point.

Contrary to the tradition of philosophy, Heidegger argues that time does not find its meaning in eternity, time finds its meaning in death. But it is not evident why Heidegger's account of time should in any way be superior to the traditional conception of time. Drawing on the criticism raised by Lévinas and Blanchot, that death — like eternity — is never at our disposal to understand the phenomenon of time, we can see that although Heidegger is aware that death is never an event in our life, he nonetheless claims that it is the awareness of our finitude that informs our understanding of time.

Yet if Heidegger does not see it as a problem that death is never at our disposal, then it becomes questionable whether Heidegger's initial critique launched against the tradition of philosophy still holds, because it is no longer evident why it matters that eternity, as a point of departure, is never at our disposal to understand the phenomenon of time.

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Death and authentic understanding

For Heidegger, death provides an orientation for our authentic temporal understanding.

Levinas agrees with Heidegger that mortality is much more significant than previous philosophers of time have acknowledged, but for Levinas, it is not my death, but the death of the other that determines our understanding of time. He is critical of Heidegger’s tendency to collapse the ecstases (past, present, and future) of temporality into one another, and seeks to move away from what he sees as a totalizing view of time.

Levinas wants to rehabilitate the unique character of the instant, or present, without sacrificing its internal dynamic to the onward progression of the future, and without neglecting the burdens of the past that history visits upon us.

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Shepherds and Golden Age

The Eclogues are a series of ten poems that Virgil wrote circa 40 BC.

The majority of these poems deal with shepherds and their various concerns. The fourth Eclogue is decidedly different in this respect. In the poem Virgil makes several statements about a child destined to bring a Golden Age and free the world from fear. Early Christian scholars (such as Saint Augustine) read this poem and concluded that this child that Virgil spoke of had to be the Messiah: Jesus Christ.

Later writers, such as the Italian poet Dante, would also interpret this poem to be a prophecy regarding the Christ.

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Recursive structure of the event

Heidegger's Ereignis has a recursive structure in two ways.

First, as the structure of reality and of our thought, it is simply recursive; that is, it has a recursive pattern of down and up loops in which each iteration down to the basis is a more simple version of the previous one and each iteration up from the basis is more complicated than the previous one.

Second, as the structure of entities and their environment, Ereignis is mutually recursive. As mutually recursive, this structure describes or determines the interrelatedness of entities with each other and with their environment. This mutual recursion works like two functions which use as input the output of the other. For example: f (x) = y and g (y) = x. When pointing out such a situation Heidegger often uses the terms "equiprimordial," "mutual conditioning," "interpenetrating," and soon.

Leslie C Miller


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Heidegger and the event

I said Ereignis means "event" through much of Heidegger's work, not at all. Indeed, certain texts speculate on its etymology but do not propose a new technical term. Being and Time (51-52) speaks of death as an event. What could it possibly mean to call death an appropriation?

And Heidegger certainly does not mean that death is "emergence into intelligibility." On the contrary. Also, Being and Time outlines a philosophy of history in which Heidegger often refers to past events. It is ironic that Sheehan, who is so concerned with dating texts, should not realize that the early Heidegger understands Ereignis literally. For a later Heideggerian usage consult the Afterword to "What is Metaphysics?" where product and event (Erzeugnis and Ereignis) are distinguished. Finally, in those passages where Heidegger does attempt to ramify the sense of Ereignis by comments on aneignen and eräugen (e.g., in Identität und Differenz), he plays on the tension between the unreflective normal sense of the term and his etymological sense.

Understanding these passages means keeping both in mind, and Heidegger underscores this fact by writing Er-eignis when he wishes to stress his etymological sense. He wants to emphasize that genuine historical events are changes in mentality and the understanding of the world, and not mere happenstance.

To indiscriminately substitute "appropriation" wherever Heidegger utters Ereignis, as Sheehan seems to propose, is to produce the sort of mystical mumbo-jumbo with which Heidegger is all too often and wrongly associated. Or should we also translate Begebenheit as "be-givenness"?
Willis Domingo

Lighting governance and fire

When we talk about Heidegger and his ideas concerning " the fire", we think about Heraclitus.

Heraclitus thought a lot about "gathering". Gathering, worldling, writing... The world is thought as the ever-living, which in turn can be thought as fire which is not merely the glow of a flame, but the "worlding" of the world in the sacrificial fire, the oven's fire, the campfire, but also the glow of a torch, the scintillation of the stars.In fire, lighting, glowing, blazing, soft shining hold sway, and that which opens an expanse in brightness.

In fire, however, consuming, welding, cauterizing extinguishing also reign. When Heraclitus speaks of fire, he is primarily thinking of the lighting governance, the direction which gives measure and takes it away.

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Suffering and technological age

To write inevitably has to see with the tragic.

Especially if the writing makes hypertextual. In fact, Heidegger links tragedy and technology. He argues that because technology "enframes" the planet and everything on it we become cut off from an awareness of tragedy: the originary strife, the enigma of suffering, the "movedness" of all nature including our own.

As is evident in Thucydides and plays such as Antigone, the Greeks were already aware of the essential place of the tragic in their daily lives and communities. It is this awareness that Heidegger wanted to recapture. It is not so much that technology eliminates tragedy but the fact we are unaware that tragedy is a defining characteristic of human existence even in the technological age.

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Self positing consciousness

For Husserl consciousness is absolutely self-positing (so much so that the annihilation of the world leaves it untouched) and as such is absolutely constitutive of the meaning of transcendent reality.

For Heidegger human being in its facticity does not posit itself over against the world and then constitute it presuppositionlessly from some supreme vantage point. Rather, we find ourselves already thrown-open (posited into possibilities), which possibilities in turn constitute the meaningfulness or being-dimension of the things we meet in the world.

As already thrown-open (geworfen), we are already opened up (vereignet) by possibility, and we attain authentic selfhood, not self-position, by personally reappropriating our openness.

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Human being as a moving process

Heidegger doesn't believe that we "have possibilities", as if possibilities were somehow things that might or might not happen.

Possibilities are not occurrences for Heidegger. Rather, human being is possibility. Existence, for Heidegger, means to be thrown into possibility all the time. The existential concept of possibility sees human being as a primal openness, as a moving process, in its very Being. Abstracting static essences from that openness may be our human tendency, but basing our metaphysical, epistemological, and logical theories on that abstracting is fundamentally misguided. We cannot grasp our being; we can never grasp "it". Trying to grasp it, to get it, heaven help us most especially trying to keep it!, is like trying to carry water in our hands.

Being is not a thing to grasp or keep. It is a movement, and it is a movement that Heidegger calls thrown projection.

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Falling or to be thrown

To fall" and "to be thrown" is not the same.

To be thrown into the world is not especially grounded in anxiety. On the contrary, it is even reassuring for the dasein!
Falling is not the same. Falling, explains Heidegger, is a turning-away or fleeing of Dasein into its "they-self." This turning-away is grounded in anxiety. Anxiety is what makes fear possible.

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Falling with Heidegger

Falling for Heidegger is the present state of dasein, which is wholly seen through the being-alongside of other daseins.

This being-with and alongside with makes up now choices and actions of entities. One acts a certain way, chooses a certain meaning of being for a certain point due to its relationship to "them."Because we are always falling, or fallen into "them," in to the "das man", the everyday man that we are and that we connect with.

Falling then is the third component that connects up with "existentiality" and "facticity" to form the temporality that provides dasein with the structure from which it discloses itself in average everydayness within the world .

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