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Showing posts with label hegel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hegel. Show all posts

Thursday

Adorno's conflictedness about Hegel

Hegel's ubiquity in Adorno and Adorno's conflictedness about him are evident even to beginners, but hitherto it needed hard-won expertise to discriminate Adorno's near-idolatry of Hegel from his often angry critique of him.

By contrast, History and Freedom compels Adorno to engage systematically with the major Hegelian themes: the [historicized] dialectic, universal and particular, identity and non-identity, objectivity and subjectivity, self-consciousness (both individual and collective), the World Spirit, the Absolute, conscience and law, race and nation. (Short version of the critique: Hegel too often ontologizes or absolutizes one term of a binary pair, thus reifying what he, of all people, should have kept fluid and "dialectical"; worse, Hegel's lapse into this error is always in favor of the "universal" and against the "particular," for the master and against the slave.)

When Adorno mentions (without quoting) some "famous" remark from Hegel (or whomever), Rolf Tiedemann's expert notes quote generously from the relevant sources, with invariably helpful comment--and, often, instructive pointers to dissonances with Adorno's other writings. (Adorno here also gives his most straightforward evaluation of Kant.)

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Friday

Hegel's Hypertext


How to Use http://www.hegel.net/ to Understand Hegel ,

Unfortunately, Lenin's famous aphorism: “It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!” is more true today and more pressing in its significance than when it was written 80 years ago.

Most Marxists will tell you that Hegel invented dialectics and that he was an ‘objective idealist’, but very, very few have actually read Hegel. However, Marx and Engels wrote very little by way of explaining Hegel’s ideas (Engels’ Socialism: Utopian& Scientific, § II and § I of Ludwig Feuerbach & the End of Classical German Philosophy are the best general introductions available), but we know from Marx’s 1843 Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and his 1844 Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General that Marx formed his own view by way of a critique of Hegel, and the 1859 Grundrisse, Marx’s preparatory notes for Capital make it clear that the critique of Hegel was central to his thinking throughout his life.

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Monday

What is a chance for living beings ?


Jacques Monod, a French biologist says in his book "Chance and Necessity, Philosophical questions of the modern biology" (1970) that the living beings are distinguished from all other objects in this world by three characteristics (chapter I):


a) They have a plan which at the same time is expressed in their macroscopic structure and carried out through their performances (concept of Teleonomy).
b) An inner determinism (law, mechanism) is responsible for their outer complex structure (autonomous morpho-genesis as a teleonomical apparatus)
c) They are able to conserve, to transfer and to reproduce the Informations of their own structure without changes (reproductive invariability)


The conclusions out of this three characteristics of life as living beings in comparision to Hegel's philosophy are:


a) The teleonomical apparatus is fully logical, rational and fit for conserving and reproducing (chapter I). This could be written by Hegel! It is the Self-actualization of the Concept.
b) Evolution is the product of a contingent change in the inner mechanism (mutation) without any relation to the consequences for the teleonomical macroscopic functions or the plan (chapter VII). This I think is exactly the same as Hegel's statement that within Nature the inner is totally separated from the outer and there is no mediatioin between the two.
c) And therefore after the (CONTINGENT) incident of the changed inner (microscopic) mechanism there is only a rigid NECESSITY of Selection on the macroscopic level of the organism or better of the living concept. But this living concept is very CONSERVATIVE because of its complex regulation, and therefore only such mutations can be accepted which can strengthen the concept or even give it (very seldom) new possibilities (chapter VII). This could be written by Hegel who says that the living concept can only exist as an entire and full concept. Otherwise the macroscopic structure would become a monster, that is an object which would no longer be fit as a living concept.
d) According to the modern theory, Evolution is therefore not the principle or characteristic of Life because its cause lies within the imperfection of the mechanism of conservation (chapter VI) or as Hegel would say: Changes in Nature are based on CONTINGENCY and therefore a development occurs only as process of the Concept and this is not a question for the natural sciences but for the science of philosophy.



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Saturday

Process of self-production

The dialectic is the process of self-production of subjectivity, of the absolute subject, and as such is its "necessary action".

According to the structure of subjectivity, the production process has three layers. First of all as consciousness, subjectivity is drawn immediately to its object. This immediate, therefore indeterminate, representation, Hegel names 'being', the universal, the abstract.

But the relation of the object to the subject is thereby overlooked. Only through this relating back of objects to the subject, will the object as object for the subject, and the subject for itself, that is, as relation to the object, be represented Nevertheless, as long as we only distinguish between object and subject, refection and being, and remain tied to these distinctions , the movement from object to subject has not yet produced subjectivity as this totality for itself. The object, being, is doubtless already with the subject as mediated by reflection, but this mediation itself is not yet itself the presentation of this innermost movement of the subject for itself. Only when the thesis of object and the antithesis of subject becomes discernible in its necessary synthesis , is the movement of the subjectivity of the object-subject-relation established in its trajectory.

This trajectory is departure from the thesis, progression through antithesis, transition as synthesis, and, as this totality , the return of this posited establishment to itself. This trajectory gather the totality of subjectivity in its developed unity. So assembled it grows, 'con-crescit', becomes concrete. Accordingly, dialectic is speculative. 'Speculari' means to discern, to set before, conceive, com-prehend [be-greifen]. Hegel states in the introduction of the 'Science of Logic' (ed. Lasson, Bd. I, S. 38) : Speculation consists "in conceiving the opposed in its unity".


Hegel's characterization of speculation becomes clearer when we take note that with speculation the synthesis results not only from conceptual unity, but , in the first place and always, from the conception of 'the opposed', as such. To this belongs the conception of opposites as appearing against and within one another, which as the reign of antithesis is in this manner presented in the "Logic of Essence" ( that is , the logic of reflection). From this self reflecting appearance, this mirroring, the 'speculari' ('speculum': the mirror) receives its sufficient determination.

So considered, speculation is the positive totality of what dialectic must signify here: not transcendental delimitation critically or polemically thought, but the mirroring and reuniting of opposites as the spirit's process of self production.


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Friday

Becoming and Being according to Hegel


Posted by Ryan Krahn -

To briefly summarize the passages preceding page 105 in The Science of Logic of Hegel (A.V. Miller 1969 translation) for contextual purposes, we have seen that Being is initially pure (indeterminate) and immediate which is to say that there is nothing we can say about it which will in any way distinguish it from something else; it is, here, abstract and serves as a presuppositionless starting-point to philosophy.

Insofar as we cannot distinguish it from anything else and it is immediate, Being is Nothing – they are the same. But Being and Nothing are, at the same time, not the same, for they are two different indeterminacies, continually vanishing into one another, and insofar as they must vanish into the other they cannot be the same. They are indiscernibly distinct.This vanishing of one into the other is Becoming. The second(1) we think of Being, it vanishes into Nothing, and the second we think of Nothing, it vanishes into Being – this is the fluidity, the extreme indeterminacy, of Becoming. There are two moments, two processes, in, and which doubly determine, Becoming: ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be. As is straightforward from the descriptions themselves, ceasing-to-be is (immediate) Being changing into Nothing, and coming-to-be is (immediate) Nothing changing into Being. When either process is completed the process is immediately reversed: the result vanishes. This vanishing implies both a continuous disappearance (hiddenness, concealment) and reappearance (presencing, disclosure). Each moment implies and is, thus, united with the other moment: Being is Nothing and Nothing is Being. But the movement is always a to-and-fro, a back-and-forth, and this restricts the possibility of a side-by-side Being-Nonbeing unity. Insofar as this either of these processes of vanishing are circular and define Becoming each (coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be) is the very process of Becoming. But insofar as each vanishing is really the vanishing into the other it is understood as only a one moment of the greater process of Becoming. To describe Becoming this way is not the same as to say that, for example, my house IS and IS NOT, for in this example I am assuming a determination, and Becoming is not here seen to be a equation of the Being and Nonbeing of determinate things. That is, at this point the vanishing is Becoming, but not yet the becoming of something.But there does seem to be an indeterminate determination of differences, for Becoming is sustained only for as long as Being and Nothing are distinct, passing into one another. Another way to put this is that you cannot “pass into” something that is the same. Difference enables the possibility of the movement of “passing into” or “vanishing.” So Being and Nothing can only vanish into one another insofar as they are different but the very indistinguishability of Being and Nothing, or the processes of Becoming, Being-into-Nothing and Nothing-into-Being, is the vanishing of this difference. If this distinctness vanishes, then so does the vanishing itself; that is, the vanishing that is Becoming can no longer sustain itself and it, too, vanishes (this is a vanishing of the vanishing) and is replaced by a state of idleness, a Determinate Being (Dasein). This could be seen as the ‘self-undermining’ of Becoming.


As Becoming stops, Being and Nothing are still distinct in a way, but are no longer absolutely distinct; that is, all sense of pure Being and pure Nothing – in the sense that one excludes the other – have fallen away. This indistinguishability fuses Being and Nothing together in a unity where they are no longer purely themselves. This purity, now lost in the newfound co-existence of Being and Nothing, had been retained in Becoming, as each process would vanish entirely, establishing the other in its purity, and then vice-versa. When pure Being and Nothing can no longer reappear, when they no longer vanish in order to reappear, they cannot be restored in their purity, and thus their purity is lost. Determinacy arises in the face of the loss of purity, at the point of the sublation of pure Being and Nothing.This moment of self-impurification is the sublation of Becoming. The sublation of Being and Nothing’s former purity can be seen as a negation (it is the case that Being and Nothing are NOT pure, now), but not as an annihilation, because the moments of pure Being, Nothing and Becoming are now moments that led to a new configuration of Being (as Determinate). Insofar as it does not annihilate and builds upon what it has negated, it can be seen as a preservation. But Sublation is also a cessation in that Becoming is brought to a halt, no longer in an ever-changing to-and-fro with itself, but now settled into a pacified, “stable unity” or “oneness.” Sublation causes that which is sublated (in this case, Becoming) to lose its immediacy, but this is not analogous with a type of destruction that results in a nihilist reduction to Nothing, for Hegel refers to Nothing as sublated in this sublation.We see here that Hegel thinks that both Heraclitean difference and Paremenidean purity are in a way analogous and are internally unsustainable. This movement to Determinate Being does not rest on our desire, as philosophers, to stabilize Becoming nor on our inability to see Becoming as anything but leading to Determinate Being.

Rather, Hegel derives this logical movement of Becoming to Determinate Being, not on the basis of our personal demands but, from the internal logic of Being itself; that is, Being’s own structure necessitates this move to Determinate Being.(1) This measure of time (seconds) is used in a strictly figurative sense insofar as Time has not yet been introduced into the Logic because Being is still indeterminate and Time would determine Being if it were to be introduced. Thus, Being is primordial to time. So we can say that (pure) Being is nothing more or less than Becoming, it is immediately Becoming, as Gadamer has pointed out in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic, trans. P.C. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) 89

Posted by Ryan Krahn

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Jean-Philippe Pastor


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Sunday

Hegel's interpretation of time


This a text from Mike Johnduff.


Division Two, Chapter Six, xvi... The extent to which an even more radical understanding of time than Hegel's makes itself evident in Kant, will be shown in the first division of the second part of this treatise.

The reference to the first division of the second part of course doesn't mean anything, because this portion was never published. I haven't read Heidegger's book on Kant yet, which is supposed to answer some of the issues that first division of the second part would have posed, but I'm just thinking now that, given Heidegger's interpretation of the historizing potential of Dasein, Kant would have a more radical understanding of time than Hegel.

Hegel reduces time down to history. And while Heidegger's view of time is probably closest to Hegel's with respect to the the degree to which he accords it importance and determining power over Being, Heidegger we know is farthest from Hegel in interpreting things as present-at-hand or as realized potentials, and thus might have more affinity with the indeterminate and yet primordial phenomenon of time in Kant.

That is, Hegel reduces time right down to the now, and then extends this now out to encompass history. Kant leaves time intederminate--it has no relation to history other than as the factor which makes it possible. Because it is a possibility or a categorical determinant of existence for Kant, then, it might be closer to the act of stretching-itself-along or temporalizing itself historically that Heidegger has in mind when he says Dasein historizes. And because this potential is so determinate yet not present-at-hand at all in Kant, it might then be said to be more "radical:" it hits more at the nature of temporality as it determines Being.

While Hegel gives time such an important place in its ability to detemine Being, he ultimately undoes this importance in making it something present-at-hand. Kant of course leaves time mostly unelaborated as a concept--that is, when compared to Hegel--but it remains less present-at-hand than in Hegel and thus more powerful.

Posted by Mike Johnduff


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Friday

Conflict of rights


More than two thousand years after Aristotle's Poetics, Hegel proposed his own original and highly influential theory of tragedy.

Unlike Aristotle, who defines tragedy in terms of specific requirements of plot and character, Hegel defines it as, at bottom, a dynamic contest between two opposing forces--in effect, a collision or conflict of rights.

According to this scheme, the most tragic events are those in which two esteemed values or goals are in opposition and one of them must give way. For instance, suppose in a particular case we find ourselves torn between our private conscientious opinions or religious beliefs and our legitimate duties and obligations to the state. Such would be the circumstance, for example, of a conscientious objector facing military service. And such indeed is the situation of Sophocles's play Antigone, whose title heroine finds herself caught between her religious and family obligations and her duties as a public citizen.

In essence, then, a properly constructed Hegelian tragedy involves a situation in which two rights or values are in fatal conflict. Thus it is not (strictly speaking) tragic when good defeats bad or when bad defeats good. From Hegel's point of view, the only tragic confrontation is one in which good is up against good and the contest is to the death.

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Wednesday

Conflict within the Good in itself

What is the metaphysics of tragedy to Hegel?

Tragedy is rooted in spirit. Its source is a division in the ethical substance, that is, in the spiritual forces that rule and propel the realm of men's deeds and desires. It is a violent collision -- not of the good with the bad -- but of the good with the good, of spiritual powers, of an ideal or an institution, such as the state, with -- for example -- the family. It is a conflict between two rights.

Hegel says:

"The sphere of this content, although capable of great variety of detail, is not in its essential features very extensive. The principal source of opposition, which Sophocles in particular (in this respect following the lead of Aeschylus) has accepted and worked out in the finest way, is that of the body politic, the opposition, that is, between ethical life in its social uni­versality and the family as the natural ground of moral relations. These are the purest forces of tragic representa­tion" ( IV, p. 318).


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Monday

Unresolved contradiction

The original essence of tragedy consists in the fact that within such a conflict each of the opposed sides, if taken by itself, has justification ...

In this way, an unresolved contradiction is set up. However justified the tragic character and his aim, however necessary the tragic collision, the third thing required is the tragic resolution of this conflict. By this means eternal justice is exercised on individuals and their aims in the sense that it restores the substance and unity of ethical life with the downfall of the character who has disturbed the peace.

Although the characters have a purpose which is valid in itself, they can carry it out in tragedy only by pursuing it one-sidedly and so contradicting and infringing someone else's purpose.


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Sunday

Tragedy and philosophy

Hegel and Nietzsche present two of the most important discussions of tragedy and philosophy since Aristotle.

Nietzsche claims to be the first tragic philosopher, and Hegel boasted that he had read all the Greek tragedies. Tragedy presents a challenge to rational thought because it implies a conflict in reason itself, i.e., that reason contradicts itself.
Tragic conflict is not a conflict of right and wrong, but of right with right.

Hegel’s concept of dialectical reason is a reason that sustains and endures contradiction. At issue is the question whether tragedy excludes reconciliation, or whether there is tragic reconciliation.

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Thursday

Agreement of concept and reality with Hegel


As Hegel says, by death the species is "set free from individuality" and "shows its power" over the individual. (G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences)

God alone is the true agreement of concept [Begriff] and reality [Realität]; all finite [endlichen] things involve some untruth [Unwahrheit], they have a concept and an existence [Existenz] which are incommensurable [unangemessen]. For this reason they inevitably go to ruin [zugrunde gehen], that the incommensurability [Unangemessenheit] of their concept and their existence may be evident [manifestiert]. The animal, as an individual, has its concept in the species [Gattung]; and its death [Tod] sets the species free from individuality [Einzelnheit]. [§ 24, note 2]

What is living comes to death, for its very being is a contradiction [Widerspruch]; in itself it is the general [Allgemeine], the class [Gattung], yet its immediate [unmittelbar] existence is as an individual. In death the class shows its power [Macht] over the immediate individual. [§ 221, note] .


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Wednesday

Absolute Mining


Hegel defines the Absolute Idea as the “unity of the Theoretical Idea and the Practical Idea".


The Theoretical Idea is the completed Notion or concrete concept of the world or object; the Practical Idea is the activity expressing this concept (practice); the unity of the two means fully “conscious practice”, people acting in true accord with their own nature.
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Thursday

Losing faith


Since Hegel’s time, the intellectuals have been losing faith in philosophy, in the idea that redemption can come in the form of true beliefs.

In the literary culture which has been emerging during the last two hundred years, the question “Is it true?” has yielded pride of place to the question “What’s new?”

Heidegger thought that that change was a decline, a shift from serious thinking to mere gossipy curiosity. (See the discussions of das Gerede and die Neugier in sections 35-36 of Sein und Zeit) Many fans of natural science, people who otherwise have no use for Heidegger, would agree with him on this point. On the account Richard Rorty is offering, however, this change is an advance. It represents a desirable replacement of bad questions like “What is Being?”, “What is really real?” and “What is man?” with the sensible question ...

“Does anybody have any new ideas about what we human beings might manage to make of themselves?”

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Wednesday

Beyond the reach of words


Memory, for Hegel, is the learning by rote of names, or of words considered as names, and it can therefore not be separated from the notation, the inscription, or the writing down of these names.


In order to remember, one is forced to write down what one is likely to forget. The idea in other words, makes its sensory appearance, in Hegel, as the material inscription of names. Thought is entirely dependent on a mental faculty that is mechanical through and through, as remote as can be from the sounds and the images of the imagination or from the dark mine of recollection, which lies beyond the reach of words and of thought.


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