Ordinary people

Scientism is an attitude we must reject into any consequent theory of the hypertext.

Relations between mind, world and hypertext can't be reduced to a simple realism problem in philosophy.
In fact, at the end of the 1980s, Putnam became increasingly disillusioned with what he perceived as the "scientism" and rejection of history that characterize modern analytic philosophy.

He rejected internal realism because it assumed a "cognitive interface" model of the relation between the mind and the world. Under the increasing influence of James and the pragmatists, he adopted a direct realist view of this relation. Under the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein, he adopted a pluralist view of philosophy itself and came to view most philosophical problems as nothing more than conceptual or linguistic confusions created by philosophers by using ordinary language out of its original context.

Putnam's most recent works have focused on bringing philosophy out of its self-imposed shell and back to the world of ordinary people and ordinary social problems. For example, he has written about the nature of democracy, social justice and religion. He has discussed the ideas of the continental philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, and has written articles influenced by "continental" ideas.

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Hypertextual-mind problem as illusory

Does the structure of an hypertext work like our spirit? It seems that it is not the best way to cope with the problem. Each attempt to answer the mind-body problem encounters substantial problems.

Some philosophers argue that this is because there is an underlying conceptual confusion. These philosophers, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and his followers in the tradition of linguistic criticism, therefore reject the problem as illusory. They argue that it is an error to ask how mental and biological states fit together. Rather it should simply be accepted that human experience can be described in different ways - for instance, in a mental and in a biological vocabulary. Illusory problems arise if one tries to describe the one in terms of the other's vocabulary or if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts. This is the case, for instance, if one searches for mental states of the brain. The brain is simply the wrong context for the use of mental vocabulary - the search for mental states of the brain is therefore a category error or a sort of fallacy of reasoning.

Today, such a position is often adopted by interpreters of Wittgenstein such as Peter Hacker. However, Hilary Putnam, the inventor of functionalism, has also adopted the position that the mind-body problem is an illusory problem which should be dissolved according to the manner of Wittgenstein.

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See that post with different algorithms in metabole

See the journal French Metablog with today different posts