According to Schopenhauer, the will transcends time and space, which together constitute the principle of sufficient reason of being. Time and space are conditions for manifestations of the will, but the will itself is unconditioned by time or space. The plurality of things in time and space is an objectification of the will.
Schopenhauer explains that the will cannot properly be defined as a necessary cause of its manifestations in the phenomenal world, because it is not governed by the principle of sufficient reason. The relationship between freedom and necessity is also the relationship between the will and its manifestations in time and space.
Schopenhauer also explains that the will cannot properly be defined as an aim or desire to do something, because the will does not have an aim or purpose in its willing. The principle of sufficient reason of acting, which declares that actions must logically follow from some motive, governs only manifestations of the will and not the will itself.
Schopenhauer argues that the will manifests itself in the world of individual things and in the world of individual ideas or concepts. Each individual act of will may require a motive, but the principle of sufficient reason of acting applies only to these acts of will, and not to the will itself. The will is independent of time, space, plurality, causality, reason, or motive.
Schopenhauer also argues that the will cannot properly be described as conscious, because to be conscious is to be conscious of something, and thus consciousness implies a relation between a subject and an object. The will is neither a perceiving subject nor a perceived object.
Schopenhauer explains that the will cannot properly be defined as a necessary cause of its manifestations in the phenomenal world, because it is not governed by the principle of sufficient reason. The relationship between freedom and necessity is also the relationship between the will and its manifestations in time and space.
Schopenhauer also explains that the will cannot properly be defined as an aim or desire to do something, because the will does not have an aim or purpose in its willing. The principle of sufficient reason of acting, which declares that actions must logically follow from some motive, governs only manifestations of the will and not the will itself.
Schopenhauer argues that the will manifests itself in the world of individual things and in the world of individual ideas or concepts. Each individual act of will may require a motive, but the principle of sufficient reason of acting applies only to these acts of will, and not to the will itself. The will is independent of time, space, plurality, causality, reason, or motive.
Schopenhauer also argues that the will cannot properly be described as conscious, because to be conscious is to be conscious of something, and thus consciousness implies a relation between a subject and an object. The will is neither a perceiving subject nor a perceived object.
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