According to Davidson's doctrine of anomalist monism, although mental events are identical to physical events (in the brain) under appropriate descriptions, there are no psychophysical laws (in the strict sense) that relate the two; it follows that reduction of the mental to the physical is impossible (see also supervenience).
He argued that a formal requirement for any adequate theory of linguistic meaning is that it generate theorems that express the truth conditions of sentences in the “object language” in terms of sentences in a metalanguage. He also developed sophisticated arguments against the possibility of conceptual relativism (the view that there are mutually unintelligible “conceptual schemes”) and global skepticism (the view that most if not all of one's beliefs about the world may be false).
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